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Abstract
Speed and Mannion  make a good case that the rise of populism poses significant challenges for health policy. 
This commentary suggests that the link between populism and health policy should be further nuanced in 
four ways. First, a deconstruction of the term populism itself and a focus on the far right dimension of populist 
politics; second, a focus on the supply side and more specifically the question of nationalism and the ‘national 
preference’; third, the dynamics of party competition during economic crisis; and fourth the question of policy, 
and more specifically the extent to which certain labour market policies are able to mediate demand for the far 
right.
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Populism: The Far Right Dimension
European elections are increasingly dominated by a particular 
style of politics: a focus on the ‘people’ against established 
elites, a ‘post-truth’ communication style and an emphasis 
on national sovereignty. This is the type of politics that a 
large body of literature describes as ‘populism’1: either a thin 
ideology which can cut across ideological cleavages2; or a 
discursive style, a strategic choice adopted by political actors 
in order to increase their appeal.3 At the core of populism is an 
antagonistic discursive logic that divides society between the 
‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated,’4 or in other words between 
the masses (or the ‘people’) and the elite.5 Hence, the centrality 
of ‘the people’ in a rhetoric that attempts to mobilize support 
as broadly as possible.6 
As an analytical category, however, populism is problematic. 
Whether an ideology or political style it is difficult to define or 
measure. The biggest issue is the absence of a counterfactual: 
while scholars focus on identifying which parties, groups or 
movements are populist, it is more difficult to identify which 
are not. After all, in a democracy who does not invoke the 
people? Minimal definitions and distinctions between ‘thin’ 
and ‘thick’ populism aside,7 often the term ‘populist party’ is 
used as a proxy for niche, protest, or far, ie, parties that operate 
on the fringes of the party system. It is also often used in a 
normative manner to describe a party or group one disagrees 
with or disapproves of. When assessing the implication of this 
type of politics for specific policies, however, the normative 
dimension is not helpful. It is important to nuance and further 
unpack the category of parties under investigation. 
A key aspect relevant for health policy - and welfare policies 
more broadly - is that most of the parties that have been 
electorally successful on a ‘populist’ platform share their 
emphasis on ‘the national preference’: ie, they advocate 
policies that give native groups sole or priority access to 
welfare provisions and the collective goods of the state. 
Hence in this brief article I will steer the focus specifically on 
parties that may be classified as far right: ie, parties that claim 
ownership of nationalism and offer ‘nationalist solutions’ 
to all socio-economic problems by advocating policies of 
exclusion.8 The far right may be understood as an umbrella 
term that encompasses both ‘old’ and ‘new,’9 ie, both extreme 
and radical variants: while all far right parties focus on one 
form of nationalism or another, they differ in their relationship 
with democracy, the extent to which they endorse and adopt 
violence, and the extent to which they distance themselves 
from fascism and racism.8
A number of far right parties experienced an increase in their 
support across Europe during the 2014 European Parliament 
elections including the French Front National (FN), the Greek 
Golden Dawn (GD), the Danish People’s Party (DF) and 
the True Finns (TF) among others.10 Many have dominated 
the agenda in a number of national elections since: the GD 
has experienced steady support since 2012 despite key 
party officials undergoing trial for maintaining a criminal 
organization; the Austrian FPÖ candidate came very close 
to winning the Presidential election in 2016; despite coming 
second in the 2017 Dutch elections, the Freedom Party PVV 
increased its support; and in the 2017 French Presidential 
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elections Marine Le Pen made it to the second round. 
Nationalism: Health Policy and Access to the Collective 
Goods of the State
Speed and Mannion focus on the implications of the rise and 
success of these parties on ‘the design and implementation of 
national (and international) health policies.’11 The paradox 
here is that while indeed the implications are negative, welfare 
policies offer a justification for these parties, a strategy of 
appeal. As noted above, while far right parties differ in many 
ways, the shared ability of these parties to mobilise support 
by advocating strict immigration policies and policies that 
place the ‘native’ inhabitants first in a range of areas including 
welfare and social services, points to the importance of 
nationalism as a common denominator. Nationalism, 
understood as the attainment and maintenance of the 
unity, autonomy and identity of a deemed nation,12 offers a 
justification of exclusion by shifting the blame for problems 
related to welfare and social services, to foreigners. So while 
‘healthcare has benefitted enormously from international 
cooperation and agreements that allow the free flow of people, 
capital, goods, and information,’11 at the same globalization 
has heightened the insecurities of certain social groups which 
consider themselves to be the ‘losers’ of this process.13 Far 
right parties seek to capitalise on such popular insecurities by 
advocating restricting access to those who do not belong to 
‘our’ nation. 
This is a feature of both the ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ variants. 
In the extreme right category, the Greek GD actively offers 
alternative services of state and welfare provisions in line 
with its ideal to encompass all aspects of social life. The 
party’s social solidarity programme has special provisions 
for vulnerable social groups who, it claims, are not protected 
by the state. In line with this, the party has organised blood 
donations and ‘soup kitchens’ intended only for Greeks, a 
status which citizens must confirm with the presentation of 
their Greek identity card. It also set up a health provision 
service in order to support Greek people as a substitute to the 
‘failing’ and ‘decaying’ national health care system.14
Access to welfare is also part of the discourse of the radical 
variants. Indeed the European far right parties that are most 
electorally successful are not the extreme variants – the GD’s 
success in an aberration rather than the norm- but rather 
those, which are using a ‘civic’ version of nationalism in their 
rhetoric.15 A large body of literature has focused on the ways 
in which far right parties have sought to distance themselves 
from fascism and overt racism in their attempt to gain votes. 
This is because, while voters might be sympathetic to their 
policies, particularly over immigration, most would be 
unlikely to support a party that they perceive as overtly racist 
or a threat to the democratic system.9,16 While, therefore, far 
right parties are exclusionary by definition, they no longer 
justify exclusion predominantly on ethnic terms. The radical 
variants are more successful precisely because they are able 
to tailor their discourse to the liberal and civic characteristics 
of national identity and present themselves as the defenders 
of democracy, diversity and tolerance. These parties present 
‘our’ nation as one of tolerance, liberalism and diversity 
threatened by an influx of intolerant, reactionary and narrow-
minded ‘others.’ ‘We,’ they argue, do not exclude on the basis 
of race but on the basis of toleration, ie, those who reject ‘our’ 
liberal democratic values.15
A good example is the FN. Since Marine Le Pen took over 
from her father in 2011, she has pursued a strategy of “de-
demonization” of the party and a softening of its rhetoric. The 
party justifies its policy of the “préférence nationale” by invoking 
primarily the cultural and civic aspects of national identity, 
offering ideological rather than biological, rationalizations 
for who belongs to the French nation. The party increasingly 
presents the other as hostile because their so-called intolerant 
beliefs pose a threat to “our” national values, rather than 
because of their ethnicity per se, thus shifting the boundaries 
of exclusion from ethnicity to ideology.
Nationalism and Economic Crisis: The Dynamics of Party 
Competition 
Economic crisis heightens the importance of the economy 
in the political agenda, as economic issues become the key 
priority for voters and for parties that seek to address voters’ 
concerns. According to party competition literature, this is 
problematic for far right parties whose agenda tends to de-
emphasise economic concerns.17,18 In many ways, therefore, 
the increase in support for far right parties at times of economic 
instability constitutes a paradox because the latter presents an 
opportunity not for the far right, but rather for parties that 
have ownership of the economic issue. This includes certain 
mainstream, non-populist parties, which have long-term 
experience of governance and are more likely to be seen as 
credible managers of the economy because of this experience; 
and left-wing parties that place an emphasis on equality and 
wealth redistribution, offering direct economic solutions to 
economic problems. 
Empirically, however, this has not happened. This is 
because far right parties have not only capitalised on voters’ 
insecurities, but also on the inability of competitor parties to 
attract voters because of their own ideological and identity 
problems. An example is the so-called crisis of the left across 
Europe: in Greece PASOK imploded after the eruption of the 
economic crisis, never to regain its ground while new liberal-
centre and centre-left initiatives remain marginalized; in the 
2017 Dutch elections the Labour coalition suffered big losses; 
in the United Kingdom, Corbyn’s Labour party battled its 
identity between ‘old’ and ‘new’; and in France the Socialist 
Party failed to attract much support in the 2017 presidential 
elections after Hollande failed to offer solutions to France’s 
problems including social integration, vulnerability to 
terrorism and exclusionist – though highly protectionist – 
labour market. 
In sum, despite expectations, left-wing parties have 
broadly speaking failed to capitalise on the economic crisis. 
The opportunity opened up by the economic crisis only 
materialised into electoral gains for few left-wing parties. 
This includes mainly parties on the far left of the political 
spectrum in peripheral countries whose political systems have 
been historically polarised along left-right lines. For example, 
the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece and 
PODEMOS in Spain both made electoral gains during the 
2014 European Parliament elections. SYRIZA maintained this 
support and was able to form a coalition government in the 
subsequent January 2015 national election, while PODEMOS 
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was not. 
What all electorally successful far left parties have in common 
is their nationalist narrative19,20: ie, their emphasis on national 
sovereignty and the need to emancipate the nation from 
exploitative external powers and their internal collaborators. 
SYRIZA’s 2015 electoral campaign, for example, was premised 
on a rhetoric of ‘resistance,’ legitimated through nationalism. 
Its main pillars included opposition against external elites, 
such as the IMF and the Troika, and Germany; and the 
denouncement of internal elites as collaborators, with a focus 
on the mainstream PASOK and ND who were blamed for 
the crisis. The party denounced austerity as a ‘German-led 
impositions’ and criticised the euro as a vehicle of German 
exploitation.’21 In other words, voters have tended to trust 
parties that offer ‘nationalist’ solutions’ to the economic crisis 
and put forward a nationalist narrative during their electoral 
campaign. 
The Politics of Demand and the Importance of Labour 
Market Policies
Can certain policies mediate demand for far right parties? The 
relationship between economic distress and far right party 
support is to an extent conditional on those labour market 
policies that might mediate the risks and costs of economic 
malaise on different labour market groups. More specifically, 
unemployment is a key driver of economic insecurity. It 
affects outsider and insider labour market groups differently. 
First, it directly affects ‘outsiders,’ ie, those who are or become 
unemployed, because these groups are deprived of an income. 
Second, it indirectly affects ‘insiders,’ ie, those in permanent 
employment, by increasing their fears of losing their job. The 
insecurity of these two groups is mediated by different labour 
market policies: the extent to which outsiders suffer financially 
depends substantially on the generosity of unemployment 
benefits; and the extent to which insiders fear losing their 
jobs depends on employment protection legislation (EPL). 
Research has shown the importance of these two labour market 
policies in mediating the effect of unemployment on economic 
insecurity, thus limiting the impact of unemployment on far 
right party support. Specifically, where such policies offer 
greater protection from the risks and costs of unemployment, 
the far right is less likely to fare well electorally. Where, on the 
other hand, these policies are less generous, the risks and costs 
of unemployment are greater and the far right is more likely to 
increase its support.22 
This is consistent with the increasing appeal of the far right 
among both the working and middle classes.23 The classic 
economic insecurity argument tends to automatically 
translate into the erroneous assumption that the economically 
insecure are first and foremost the working classes: blue 
collar, manual workers in precarious employment, or the 
unemployed. But economic insecurity is not only an argument 
about the haves and the have- nots, the unemployed and/
or the working classes. It is an argument about the extent to 
which deteriorating economic conditions may have a negative 
impact on the expectations and/ or the socio-economic status 
of both labour market outsiders and insiders, ie, a broad range 
of social groups, including the middle classes. As shown above, 
unemployment increases insecurity and hence lead to higher 
levels of far right support through two conceptually distinct 
channels: because it imposes costs on the unemployed and 
because it increases the risks for those that are employed.22 
This suggests that, because of their impact on both the 
employed and the unemployed, austerity policies are likely 
to intensify support for the far right. For example, in Greece 
those who have suffered from austerity are not only the 
marginalised sections of the population – ie, the outsiders – 
but also the large middle classes – ie, those insiders who found 
themselves much worse off. More broadly, labour market 
policies have become less protective in the past two decades 
in many European countries. The economic impact on those 
who lose their job has also been intensified by the cuts made 
to unemployment benefits prior to the crisis. EPL, which, had 
already been deregulated in many European countries prior 
to the crisis, was reduced even further, resulting in higher 
levels of insecurity among the employed.24 The adoption of 
these policies increases the risks and costs of unemployment, 
which, in turn, makes the rise of the far right more likely.
Conclusion
Populism is in many ways a broad and normative term posing 
analytical and conceptual difficulties. The challenges posed 
by the electoral success of parties that focus on sovereignty 
and ‘the national preference’ are not necessarily the product 
of populism per se, but of the far right dimension of this 
populism. When it comes to health policy, and welfare 
provision more broadly, the electoral appeal of this national 
preference constitutes a paradox: while the electoral success 
of the far right has a series of negative consequences, it is 
precisely the platform of discriminatory health and welfare 
policies that wins these parties their votes. On the supply 
side, whether extreme or radical variants, far right parties put 
forward a rhetoric that focuses on social security and priority 
access to welfare and the collective goods of the state. On the 
demand side, voters have tended to trust parties that offer 
‘nationalist’ solutions. The voting base of these parties has 
increasingly included the insecure middle classes that punish 
the incumbent and mainstream for failing to deliver on the 
state’s social contract obligations. Austerity has exacerbated 
this result. 
Beyond, however, the obvious negative consequences of the 
electoral success of the far right, there is another less obvious 
consequence: partly because of the new winning formula, 
partly because of their increasing attempts - and successes - in 
attracting the middle classes, and partly because of the crisis 
of left and liberal centre, these parties are able to permeate 
mainstream ground. They are effective in driving the agenda, 
consolidating the narrative and setting the terms on which 
other, mainstream actors, compete. The implication is critical: 
as the national preference is no longer the privilege of the far 
right, discriminatory and exclusionary welfare policies are 
more likely to be supported across the political spectrum. 
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